

# Web?



2022

RFC 9114 : HTTP/3

2015

RFC 7540 : HTTP/2

1999

RFC 2616 : HTTP/1.1

1994

Création du 

1990

Tim Berners-Lee invente le Web pour le CERN

1984

Paul Mockapetris invente DNS

1971

RFC 114 : FTP



Organisme de standardisation du World Wide Web



- HTTP
- Adresse Web (URI)
- HTML



Le réseau Internet est adressage par les humains



Transfert de fichiers

# Hypertext Transfer Protocol

RFC 2616 / 7230 / 7540





The Web protocol


HTTP/1

HTTP/1.1


HTTP/2

HTTP/3







HTTP = The backbone of the Web





GET








GET





Video



Images



GET



Web API



File Transfer




Web Services


# HTTP Protocol

Application Layer Protocol

TCP Port 80 : HTTP  
TCP Port 443 : HTTPS




Client



Web Server

# HTTP Protocol




# HTTP Protocol





HTTP

=




# HTTP Workflow


UDP



TCP



Client



Web Server

# HTTP Request

```
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.pizza.com  
Cookie: XXX  
User-Agent: Mozilla
```



Client



Web Server

# HTTP Request

```
GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
```

```
Host: www.pizza.com
```

```
Cookie: XXX
```


```
User-Agent: Mozilla
```

} Request Line

} Request Headers

# Request Line

GET /index.html HTTP/1.1




# Method HTTP

<b>GET</b>	Requests a representation of the specified resource
<b>HEAD</b>	Response identical to that of a GET request, but without the response body
<b>POST</b>	Requests that the server accept the entity enclosed in the request as a new subordinate of the web resource identified by the URI
<b>OPTIONS</b>	Returns the HTTP methods that the server supports for the specified URL
<b>CONNECT</b>	Converts the request connection to a transparent TCP/IP tunnel
<b>TRACE</b>	Echoes the received request so that a client can see what (if any) changes or additions have been made by intermediate servers.
<b>PUT</b>	Requests that the enclosed entity be stored under the supplied URI.
<b>DELETE</b>	Deletes the specified resource

# Request Headers

Host: www.pizza.com



# Request Headers


## Example

Host	Used for Name based Virtual Host
User-Agent	Software used by the end user
Cookie	An HTTP cookie previously sent by the server with Set-Cookie
Referer	Identifies the address of the webpage
Date	The date and time that the message was originated


# HTTP Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache  
Content-Type: text/html

<html>  
<body>  
Welcome Bob  
</body>  
</html>



Client



Web Server

# HTTP Response

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

} Response Line

Server: Apache

Content-type: text/html

Content-Length: 30


} Response Headers

<html>... </html>

} Body

# Response Line


HTTP/1.1 200 OK



# Status Code

1XX	Information
2XX	Success
3XX	Redirection
4XX	Client Error
5XX	Server Error

**404**  
Page not found



**500**  
Internal Server Error

# Response Headers

## Exemple

<b>Server</b>	Name of the Server
<b>Content-Type</b>	The MIME type of the body of the request
<b>Content-Length</b>	The length of the request body in octets
<b>Set-Cookie</b>	Set a new cookie value
<b>Last-Modified</b>	The last modified date for the requested object

# Login


```
GET / HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.pizza.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 128
```

```
<form action="/login.php">  
  Login:<br>  
  <input type="text" name="login"><br>  
  Password:<br>  
  <input type="text" name="password"><br><br>  
  <input type="submit" value="Submit">  
</form>
```



Client



Web Server

# Set-cookie

```
POST /login.php HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.pizza.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla  
Content-Length:25
```


```
login=Bob&password=voili
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache  
Content-Type: text/html  
Set-Cookie: SESSION=GHAK89SJASHJ
```

```
<html>  
<body>  
<h1>Welcome Bob</h1>  
<a href="commandList">List Pizza command</a>  
</body>  
</html>
```



Client



Web Server

# Cookie


```
GET /commandList HTTP/1.1  
Host: www.pizza.com  
User-Agent: Mozilla  
Cookie: SESSION=GHAK89SJASHJ
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: Apache  
Content-Type: text/html  
Content-Length: 32
```


```
<html>  
<body>  
<ul>  
  <li>Royal</li>  
  <li>Figateli</li>  
</ul>  
</body>  
</html>
```





Client




Web Server





HTTP/1




HTTP/1.1




HTTP/1.1



Persistent HTTP Connections




HTTP/1.1



1st Request


2nd, 3rd, 4nd, 5n Request



Pipelining

Reduce the wait time for each response



HTTP/1.1



Chunked transfer encoding

HTTP/1

HTTP/1.1



RFC 2616


June 1999

Virtual Host by Name



Persistent Connections

Pipelining

Chunked transfer encoding



HTTP/1.1



**Pipelining Head of Line Blocking**


HTTP/2

Application (HTTP 2.0)

Session (TLS) (optional)

Transport (TCP)

Network (IP)



Application (HTTP 2.0)

Session (TLS) (optional)

Transport (TCP)

Network (IP)

HTTP/2

HEADERS Frame

DATA Frame

HTTP/1.1

```
POST /comment HTTP/1.1
Host: www.pizza.com
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 15
```

```
{"msg": "so good"}
```

Binary Framing Layer

### HEADERS Frame (stream 1)

```
:method:    GET / HTTP/1.1
:path:      /index.html
:version:   HTTP/2.0
:scheme:    https
Host:       pizza.com
user-agent: firefox/132.0.2
```

### HEADERS Frame (stream 1)


```
:status:    200
:version:   HTTP/2.0
server:     nginx/1.26
set-cookie: SESSION_ID=787889
Content-type: Text/html
```

### DATA Frame (stream 1)


```
<html>
<body>
...
</body>
</html>
```




Client



Web Server





Client

Web Server



How to solve the

Pipelining Head of Line Blocking

Problem?



HTTP/1.1

HTTP/2



HTTP/1.1

HTTP/2



RFC 7540

May 2015

Binary framing

Multiplexed

HPack Headers compression

Push

# Web technologies

## Browser Side

HTML  
CSS  
Javascript  
SVG  
PNG  
WebGL  
DOM  
MathML  
WASM  
...

*All W3C Standards*

## Server Side

Apache  
Tomcat  
Tomee  
Microsoft IIS  
Nodejs  
Nginx  
  
Python  
PHP  
Perl  
Ruby  
Java  
Golang  
Rust

*Open source or commercial*

# Transport Layer Security

Ex-Secure Socket Layer

**RFC 2246 / 4346 / 5246**

# TLS : Security Properties

- **Confidentiality** of the communication between the client and the server
- **Integrity** of the communication between the client and the server
- **Authentication** of the server and optionally of the client

**HTTP**

**=**

**HTTP**

---

**TCP**

---

**IP**

**HTTPS**

=

**HTTP**

**TLS**

**TCP**

**IP**

**SMTPS**

**=**

**SMTP**

**TLS**

**TCP**

**IP**

**IMAPS**

=

**IMAP**

**TLS**

**TCP**

**IP**

**POPS**

=

**POP**

**TLS**

**TCP**

**IP**

**LDAPS**

=

**LDAP**

**TLS**

**TCP**

**IP**

# FAUX!

SSH


=

TELNET

TLS

TCP

IP



**TLS** = {

- **Asymmetric cryptography**
- **Symmetric cryptography**
- **Cryptographic Hash functions**



# Cryptographic Hash functions

## Length



MD5	16
SHA1	20
SHA256	32
SHA512	64

# Cryptographic Hash functions

## Length




<del>MD5</del>	<del>16</del>
<del>SHA1</del>	<del>20</del>
SHA256	32
SHA512	64

Deprecated

openssl sha1 shattered-1.pdf

SHA1(shattered-1.pdf)= 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccb7f0a



**SHattered**


The first concrete collision attack against SHA-1  
<https://shattered.io>

**CWI**

Marc Stevens  
Pierre Karpman

**Google**

Elie Bursztein  
Ange Albertini  
Yarik Markov



**SHattered**

The first concrete collision attack against SHA-1  
<https://shattered.io>

**CWI**

Marc Stevens  
Pierre Karpman


**Google**

Elie Bursztein  
Ange Albertini  
Yarik Markov

openssl sha1 shattered-2.pdf

SHA1(shattered-2.pdf)= 38762cf7f55934b34d179ae6a4c80cadccb7f0a

# Symmetric cryptography



# Symmetric cryptography

**AES**

3DES

Twofish

Blowfish


RC4

Serpent

Salsa20

**ChaCha**

# Asymmetric encryption



# Symmetric

vs

# Asymmetric

- Fast
- Short key

- Simple Key exchange:  
only public key


- Complex Key exchange

- Slow
- Large key


AES

RSA


# Asymmetric encryption on data




# Asymmetric encryption on data




# Digital signature



# Digital signature




# Digital signature update example



# X509 Certificate



- Serial Number
- Issuer Name
- Validity Period
- Subject Name
- Subject Public Key
- Extensions
- Certificate Signature



# X509 Certificate

```
echo -n | openssl s_client
-connect www.twitter.com:443 |
sed -ne '/-BEGIN
CERTIFICATE-/,/-END
CERTIFICATE-/p' | openssl x509
-noout -text
```

```
Certificate:
Data:
  Version: 3 (0x2)
  Serial Number:
    6d:67:4a:06:8c:68:2a:c8:ef:2b:f0:c8:36:54:61:06
  Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
  Issuer: C=US, O=Symantec Corporation, OU=Symantec Trust Network, CN=Symantec Class 3 Secure Server
CA - G4
Validity
  Not Before: Aug 10 00:00:00 2015 GMT
  Not After : Aug 10 23:59:59 2017 GMT
  Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Twitter, Inc., OU=FRA2 Point of Presence,
  CN=twitter.com
  Subject Public Key Info:
    Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
    RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
      Modulus (2048 bit):
        00:c9:b3:1e:d0:74:6b:f2:f2:a2:6d:0f:a0:82:64:
        f3:40:24:2d:22:dd:90:d1:d2:3c:94:2e:4d:a8:cc:
        42:1d:e7:20:37:52:56:6e:4c:92:c0:d3:22:5f:fa:
        16:91:1f:be:68:ae:55:8d:d3:67:42:3e:f5:42:bb:
        69:b0:77:d7:14:51:69:85:2f:1b:cb:ea:ee:a9:2b:
        83:b0:60:57:80:8f:d4:c9:4f:82:39:09:04:31:eb:
        f5:ed:8a:40:85:ae:42:38:c0:67:19:e1:25:3a:d6:
        bc:48:ae:64:62:8b:6a:52:69:35:71:8b:7d:3e:f6:
        e4:b9:bl:47:cc:95:b6:01:3f:22:20:7b:98:a4:bc:
        bd:d7:02:49:2a:35:5c:e1:f4:84:56:37:f6:c9:70:
        03:c6:2b:34:ad:1c:83:7d:08:03:d2:d2:20:16:06:
        f8:eb:4d:97:93:46:7b:53:ba:c7:64:63:4f:4b:22:
        ab:8d:2a:6f:a6:e9:37:be:74:65:e5:ed:38:1e:fb:
        ad:62:09:ab:8d:ec:40:34:08:f8:d8:76:a6:dc:eb:
        44:77:d9:10:56:16:60:86:e0:df:2f:e4:7a:c8:ce:
        24:70:8e:0f:c7:68:1c:ae:a7:25:e5:d8:f6:77:e6:
        17:8c:4a:74:8e:24:f1:37:4e:92:29:8b:4a:b7:c9:
        49:7d
      Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
  X509v3 extensions:
    X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
      DNS:twitter.com, DNS:www.twitter.com
    X509v3 Basic Constraints:
      CA:FALSE
    X509v3 Key Usage: critical
      Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
    X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
      TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
    X509v3 Certificate Policies:
      Policy: 2.23.140.1.2.2
      CPS: https://d.symcb.com/cps
      User Notice:
        Explicit Text: https://d.symcb.com/rpa


    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
      keyid:5F:60:CF:61:90:55:DF:84:43:14:8A:60:2A:B2:F5:7A:F4:43:18:EF

    X509v3 CRL Distribution Points:
      URI:http://ss.symcb.com/ss.crl

  Authority Information Access:
    OCSP - URI:http://ss.symcd.com
    CA Issuers - URI:http://ss.symcb.com/ss.crt

  Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
    7c:f8:02:62:7c:4b:ab:77:74:99:1c:8a:a1:9c:7f:bd:e0:a2:
    48:28:44:8a:05:ce:37:18:8e:9c:dc:d7:df:2c:43:6a:35:94:
    be:52:4c:3f:1b:6c:c0:78:28:06:ef:92:e7:ae:2a:c0:cf:73:
    69:c2:bb:b6:63:93:51:1a:33:a2:fb:85:0a:26:21:08:cc:53:
    82:d3:ac:99:7a:ba:f8:b7:5c:c8:15:30:29:00:71:ab:8e:52:
    0a:fa:cd:a2:77:d0:74:87:25:47:c2:21:ef:02:24:b6:c7:74:
    45:ee:c0:82:d4:ef:37:ed:17:40:27:e8:8d:15:51:4c:6f:c4:
    fb:8d:58:14:fb:13:89:a8:4d:1d:9a:9e:0c:57:68:ed:f0:ca:
    40:18:23:f6:ef:24:bl:4e:67:97:18:db:52:57:1e:3f:61:39:
    b5:0f:6b:b5:46:52:3b:e9:24:4d:f3:de:16:71:a8:cb:33:71:
    53:db:5f:05:4f:05:c8:3e:1c:23:14:1a:88:5f:8c:5a:3f:8e:
    e1:c3:47:a9:9f:90:72:2c:a1:33:3c:74:41:b7:0d:7e:cf:cc:
    ac:02:19:82:ba:f6:1a:20:2e:a9:14:52:f4:1a:16:a4:78:a3:
    ee:e9:a3:ed:49:a2:ff:1b:8e:6e:62:11:85:29:cd:b3:b2:d4:
    99:d6:97:6e
```

# Certificate Authorities are the root of trust of TLS



**So the root of trust failure...**



**DigiNotar**  
Internet Trust Services

**trustica**



Tech News | *fileforum* Downloads | News Wire | Software Store | Network Architect's Almanac

*betanews* **Besparen op je mobiele kosten?**

Hot Topics: AT&T T-Mobile Merger | Steve Jobs Resigns | Windows 8 | HP Kills TouchPad | Cloud

### DigiNotar scandal worsens: 500+ rogue certificates issued, five CAs breached

By Larry Seltzer | Published 9 minutes ago | [Follow @lseltzer](#)

No Comments | [Like](#) | [Share](#) | [+1](#) | [Tweet](#) 2



The hacker who breached the DigiNotar certificate authority has come out, or at least claimed to. He appears to be the same hacker who breached Comodo, another CA, several months ago. (Hat tip to F-Secure.) "COMODOHACKER" seems to have a problem with the Dutch government.

# How to fix it ?


Certificate pinning

HTTP Public Key Pinning

Certificate transparency

DNS Certification Authority Authorization

# TLS Handshake (RSA)




« **What is the problem ?** »


No Perfect Backward Secrecy

No Perfect Forward Secrecy


# Diffie-Hellman




# Diffie-Hellman




# TLS Handshake (RSA-Diffie Hellman)






HTTPS/1.1



1. TCP Handshake

2. TLS Handshake

3. Data Transmission




# TLS Hardening

- TLS protocol support : TLS 1.2
- TLS Cipher Suite authorized by the server

```
openssl ciphers -v 'EDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EDH+aRSA+AES:EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM:EECDH+aRSA+AES:-  
SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-  
SHA:RSA+AESGCM:RSA+AES+SHA256:RSA+AES+SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-  
AES128-SHA:!aNULL:!eNULL:!LOW:!MD5:!EXP:!PSK:!DSS:!RC4:!SEED:!ECDSA:!ADH:!IDEA'
```


# Percentage of pages loaded over HTTPS in Chrome by platform




**TLS 1.3 is a big jump**



# TLS 1.2 (ECDHE)



# TLS 1.3



**HTTP/3**

=



**HTTP**

**QUIC**

**UDP**

**IP**

# HTTP Protocol stacks



### Secure Element



### Hardware Security Module



# TLS Hardening

<https://cryptosense.com>

<https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/>

<https://bettercrypto.org/static/applied-crypto-hardening.pdf>

<https://testssl.sh>

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing\\_for\\_SSL-TLS\\_\(OWASP-CM-001\)](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_SSL-TLS_(OWASP-CM-001))